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With a Little Help from My Friends: The Federal 
Government‘s Reliance on Cooperation from the 
States in Enforcing Immigration Policy 
Daniel G. Iles  
The operation of the United States government relies on the 
integration of disparate administrative compartments into a coherent 
regulatory scheme.
1
 At a basic level, for example, a lawmaking body 
depends upon an executor to give its laws their desired normative or 
deterrent effect. After all, what purpose does capital punishment 
serve, if there is no executioner? 
The compartmentalization of government functions is well-
documented.
2
 At the heart of separating functions within a republic is 
the dilution of centralized power.
3
 On a more pragmatic level, the 
 
  J.D. (2009), Washington University School of Law; B.A. English, Mathematics 
(2006), University of Kansas. I wish to thank my wife, Lisa, for her care and encouragement; 
my parents for their helpful insight; Professor Stephen H. Legomsky for directing my initial 
research on immigration law and policy; and the staff members and faculty advisors of the 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for their hard work.  
 1. On its official website, the United States government has hyperlinks to ―Government 
Agencies,‖ which include an ―A–Z Agency Index‖; ―Federal Government‖; ―State 
Government‖; ―Local Government‖; and ―Tribal Government.‖ Each of these leads to a page 
full of additional links, the most impressive in number being the list of agencies. However, each 
strain, no matter which is chosen, begins from the ordinate United States government and 
meanders seemingly without end. USA.gov: The U.S. Government‘s Official Web Portal, 
http://www.usa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I–III. 
 3. David T. ButleRitchie, The Confines of Modern Constitutionalism, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 
1, 13–14 (2004) (―It is Montesquieu who introduces the concept of further diluting the notion of 
sovereignty by separating the powers of government into different departments. This is a further 
compartmentalization and limitation of the structure and role of government‖ (citations 
omitted)). See also Craig S. Lerner, Calling a Truce in the Culture Wars: From Enron to the 
CIA, 17 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 277, 281 (2006) (―[S]egmentation of government agencies may 
guard against civil liberties violations, as well as provide additional spurs to action‖). Cf. 
Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, World Ocean Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries After Grotius—
Towards a New Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 645, 699–700 (2004) (―The 
compartmentalization and the fractioning of power among government agencies can lead to 
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realities of organization, size, and geography require the delegation 
of functions among governmental agencies and systems.
4
 
Unsurprisingly, then, the execution of United States immigration 
policy similarly is dependent on the cooperation of other 
governmental systems, particularly state law enforcement and 
correctional entities,
5
 because federal immigration officials are few 
and underfunded.
6
 With increased pressure added by a backdrop of 
exclusionary federal immigration policies dating back almost to the 
founding of the country,
7
 the prospect of achieving the goal of 
deporting every removable alien
8
 is bleak without the assistance of 
state and local governments. 
 
disputes on ‗turf‘ and this often results in a lack of implementation of binding obligations.‖ 
(citation omitted)). 
 4. Some delegation is inherently necessary to governmental organization. See Mistretta 
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―As Chief Justice Taft 
expressed the point for the Court . . . the limits of delegation ‗must be fixed according to 
common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.’‖ (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted)). Some degree of delegation also owes to geographical and 
psychological concerns. Robert M. M. Shaffer, Comment, Unfunded State Mandates and Local 
Governments, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1057, 1085 (1996) (―A self-centered . . . perspective on a local 
level results in a compartmentalization and fragmentation of government in which the concerns 
of neighboring local communities and the region can often be lost to the immediate interests of 
one‘s own community.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 5. After September 11, federal immigration officials enhanced their efforts with respect 
to ―deterrence, detection, apprehension, detention, removal, and investigation of criminal 
organizations that violate the border.‖ Joseph Summerill, Is Federal Immigration Detention 
Space Adequate?, 54 FED. LAW. 38, 39 (2007). Moreover, ―[the] initiative [was] intended to 
provide a mechanism to meet the challenges in each of these areas with . . . enhanced 
coordination on the federal, state, local, and international levels.‖ Id. (quoting Stewart Baker, 
Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Testimony on the 
organizational structure of Homeland Security agencies (May 11, 2006)). 
 6. According to Summerill, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement—the 
agency within the Department of Homeland Security charged with enforcing immigration 
laws—―receives funds to pay 261 immigration enforcement agents . . . to process 
approximately 78,300 criminal immigrants per year for removal by [Fiscal Year] 2008.‖ Id. at 
42 (citation omitted). That is an average of 300 cases per agent per year. Moreover, the Bureau 
maintains that it will need an additional 8,581 detention beds over the next two years 
and will ultimately need . . . 1,008 [immigration enforcement agents] to support [the 
Criminal Alien Program‘s] long-term mission of removing all criminal immigrants 
currently incarcerated in local, state, and federal correctional institutions who have 
been issued final orders of removal. 
Id. (emphasis added). That is a dramatic demand for manpower to remove a fraction of 
deportable immigrants. 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
 8. Summerill, supra note 5, at 40. Adding to the tumult is the likelihood that ―illegal 
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Public mistrust of immigrants and disfavor toward controlled 
substances have led Congress to allow removal of any noncitizen 
alien found guilty of a drug crime. To protect United States citizens 
from dangerous immigrants, Congress has required state and local, in 
addition to federal, corrections facilities to provide for in-house 
removal proceedings for criminal aliens. Yet when unregistered 
immigrant Nicholas Martinez pled guilty to possession of cocaine 
and child endangerment, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that a 
sentence to imprison him, departing upward from the sentencing 
guidelines on the basis of his lack of amenability to the prescribed 
probationary sentence, was inappropriate.
9
 
Despite Congress‘s well-established power to dictate federal 
immigration policy and its pattern of excluding aliens, and despite the 
sentencing guidelines‘ flexibility in allowing for departure sentences, 
the court of appeals reversed Martinez‘s departure sentence. In so 
doing, the court created a loophole through which an unregistered 
alien can evade immigration officials upon entry, commit a crime 
with a probationary sentence, and be forced by the state to remain 
within the United States despite the federal government‘s goal to 
remove them. Had the court approached the issue more cooperatively 
with federal policies, it would have found that the district court had a 
substantial and compelling reason to depart. 
Part I of this Note describes (A) the legislative developments of 
United States immigration policy from its roots; (B) the history of 
deportation laws; (C) deportation for controlled substance violations; 
(D) Kansas‘s modern criminal sentencing policy; and (E) the 
convergence of all of the above in Martinez. Part II distills (A) the 
trend toward exclusion in the history of immigration policy; (B) the 
policy considerations underlying sentencing guidelines; (C) the 
interplay between state and federal policymakers in immigration law; 
and (D) the problems with the Kansas Court of Appeals‘s decision in 
Martinez. Part III explores (A) the basis of the Martinez decision and 
the appellate court‘s misconception; (B) a hypothetical situation in 
which the court did not misconceive, yet made incorrect assumptions; 
and (C) a further hypothetical situation in which the court was correct 
 
immigrants who are apprehended are released during the adjudication process.‖ Id. 
 9. State v. Martinez, 165 P.3d 1048 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). 
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in its assumptions, yet under any of the situations explored, its 
decision was inappropriate. Part IV summarizes the consequences of 
Martinez and the extent to which an alternative holding would 
promote teamwork between state and federal authorities and better 
execution of Congress‘s restrictive immigration policy. 
I. IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT THROUGH UNITED 
STATES HISTORY 
A. Immigration Policy 
The history of American immigration policy follows a steady 
course from openness to exclusiveness. With few hitches, Congress 
has amassed immigration restrictions, reflecting a waning need and 
tolerance for immigrants. 
1. Development of the Nation Through Open-Door Policies 
(1776–1875) 
To establish its credibility and economic footing, the young 
United States required a momentous population influx. Accordingly, 
Congress and state legislatures enacted few anti-immigration laws, 
and those that were enacted were poorly enforced.
10
 The nation‘s 
early growth is attributable largely to the contributions of immigrants 
and their descendants.
11
 
The Alien Act of 1798
12
 stands out as an early federal statute 
restricting immigration. Under the Alien Act, the President could 
expel aliens he considered dangerous.
13
 At the same time, however, 
Congress enacted more legislation that encouraged or protected 
 
 10. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993) (supporting this general proposal, yet refuting the 
―misinterpretation‖ of immigration in the nation‘s first century as being wholly unregulated and 
open). 
 11. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[1] (Matthew 
Bender & Co. 2008) (1959). 
 12. Id. (citing Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570). 
 13. Congress allowed the Act to expire, though, because of popular backlash against the 
broad grant of expulsion power. Id. 
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immigration.
14
 These acts reflected the ongoing policy of welcoming 
immigrants. 
Hard times led to opposition of the federal laissez-faire attitude 
toward immigration.
15
 States began to impose their own restrictions 
on immigration, and though the Supreme Court struck down such 
legislation on federalism grounds,
16
 Congress took note of the 
undercurrent of discontent. 
2. Experiments with a Restrictive Approach to Immigration 
Policy (1875–1917) 
The first reaction to the undercurrent of opposition to Congress‘s 
leniency on immigration was the Act of March 3, 1875,
17
 which 
barred immigration of criminals and prostitutes.
18
 In 1882
19
 Congress 
enacted its ―first general immigration statute,‖ which imposed a head 
tax and excluded whole classes of persons.
20
 Later, Congress enacted 
the contract labor laws,
21
 which further restricted immigration.
22
 The 
popular perception that immigration was interfering with—not 
aiding—the developing United States finally led to Congress‘s 
 
 14. For example, in 1819, Congress improved conditions on ships carrying immigrants. 
Act of March 2, 1819, Ch. 41, 3 Stat. 488. And on July 4, 1864, Congress enacted a bill ―To 
encourage Immigration.‖ Act of July 4, 1864, Ch. 245, 13 Stat. 385, repealed by Act of March 
30, 1868, Ch. 141, 15 Stat. 58. According to Gordon, this was the last federal ―legislation 
designed to encourage immigration.‖ GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 2.02[1]. Gordon also 
noted that ―some of the states had active programs to promote immigration.‖ Id. 
 15. See supra note 14. 
 16. GORDON ET AL., supra note 11. 
 17. Id. § 2.02[2] (citing Act of March 3, 1875, Ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. (citing Act of Aug. 3, 1882, Ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214). 
 20. Id. In particular, this act excluded ―idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to 
become a public charge.‖ Id. See also Chinese Exclusion Act, Act of May 6, 1882, Ch. 126, 22 
Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) (disallowing immigration by Chinese aliens). 
 21. GORDON ET AL., supra note 11 (citing Act of Feb. 26, 1885, Ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332; Act 
of Feb. 23, 1887, Ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414). 
 22. The contract labor laws limited the importation of ―cheap foreign labor under labor 
contracts that depressed the [United States] labor market‖ and allowed the deportation of 
violating immigrants. Id. According to Gordon, this was the first deportation statute since the 
Alien Act of 1798. Id. 
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codification of its immigration law in 1891.
23
 This new legislation 
represented the most restrictive enactment yet.
24
 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, federal immigration 
policy continued its trend toward general exclusion of aliens. In 1903, 
Congress excluded anarchists
25
 and extended the statute of limitations 
for deportation of illegal entrants from one year to three.
26
 A 1907 
statute expanded the list of excluded classes.
27
 The flood of 
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe spurred American 
jingoism and popular demand for further immigration restrictions.
28
 
3. Refinement of Restrictive Immigration Policy (1917–1952) 
Congress began elaborating upon qualitative and quantitative 
restrictions on immigration in 1917, when it required immigrants to 
pass a literacy test
29
 and created the Asiatic Barred Zone.
30
 In the 
wake of World War I, facing a depression and general fear of a flood 
of European immigration, Congress imposed numerical restrictions 
 
 23. Id. (citing Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084). 
 24. Id. Under this Act, the federal government could inspect entering immigrants and 
deport any alien who entered illegally. More classes were excluded from entry, notably persons 
―previously convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude.‖ Other excluded classes 
included ―persons suffering from a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, . . . paupers, and 
polygamists.‖ Id. 
 25. Id. (citing Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213). Inspired by panic in the wake of 
President McKinley‘s assassination, this was the first political exclusion in United States 
immigration law. Id. 
 26. Id. (citing Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213). 
 27. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898). The list grew to include: 
the feebleminded, children unaccompanied by their parents, persons suffering from 
physical or mental defects that might affect their ability to earn a living, persons 
afflicted with tuberculosis, persons who admitted the commission of a crime involving 
moral turpitude, and women coming to the United States for prostitution or other 
immoral purposes. Id. 
 28. Id. The fervor was augmented by a commissioned report recommending additional 
immigration restrictions. See id. 
 29. Id. § 2.02[3] (citing Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874). According to Gordon, 
President Wilson opposed and vetoed the literacy test requirement, but Congress overrode his 
veto. Id. 
 30. Id. The Asiatic Barred Zone prohibited immigration by non-Japanese Asians. Japanese 
immigration already was barred by a ―Gentleman‘s Agreement‖ between the United States and 
Japan. Id. 
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on immigration.
31
 Then, in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 
Congress mandated the systemized registration and fingerprinting of 
immigrants.
32
 
Several enactments during the 1940s and 1950s contravened the 
restrictive trend. Immigration legislation of this era created 
particularized exceptions to the generally strict exclusion and 
deportation laws.
33
 However, these merely were departures from a 
cemented policy of exclusion. 
4. Immigration and Nationality Acts of 1952 and 1996 
Congress overrode President Truman‘s veto of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 (―1952 INA‖),34 a broad refinement and 
codification of immigration law. The 1952 INA prescribed detailed 
grounds for exclusion and deportation, as well as procedures for entry 
and deportation.
35
 The grounds for and enforcement of exclusion 
continued to expand,
36
 while deportation procedure ensured due 
process of law and allowed for appeals of adverse decisions.
37
 
The 1952 INA was amended in 1996 by the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (―IIRAIRA‖).38 Among 
other things,
39
 the IIRAIRA implemented procedures for the 
 
 31. Id. (citing Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5). Immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere were not subject to these quotas. Id. 
 32. Id. § 2.02[4], (citing Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670). 
 33. For example, a provision of the Alien and Registration Act of 1940 allowed the 
suspension or deportation of resident aliens of good character. Id. The Displaced Persons Act 
allowed immigration of refugees. Id. (citing Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 
1009). The War Brides Act of 1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659, and the Fiancees Act of 1945, ch. 
520, 60 Stat. 339, allowed the immigration of soldiers‘ wartime wives and fiancees. Id. And 
Congress enacted an exception to immigration restrictions for aliens who enlisted and served in 
the United States military. Id. 
 34. Id. § 2.03[1] (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163). 
Although Truman objected to the bill‘s harshness, Congress did not amend it before its passage. 
Id. 
 35. Id. §§ 2.03[2][d]–2.03[2][h]. 
 36. Id. § 2.03[2][d]. Grounds for deportation under the Act included illegal entry, 
narcotics violations, and violations of registration and reporting requirements. Id. § 2.03[2][f]. 
 37. Id. § 2.03[2][h]. 
 38. The purpose of the amendment was to incorporate new removal procedures into the 
1952 INA. See id. § 64.03[1]. 
 39. The IIRAIRA allowed for the alien‘s incarceration through her sentence before 
removal, as long as there was no additional detention at an Immigration and Naturalization 
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expedited removal of aliens convicted of crimes, including controlled 
substance violations,
40
 and required the availability of removal 
proceedings at federal, state, and local correctional facilities.
41
 The 
1952 INA and IIRAIRA served the government‘s interest in 
efficiently and effectively excluding and removing criminal aliens. 
5. Civil Penalties for Unlawful Entry and Criminal Penalties for 
Unlawful Reentry 
Currently, aliens are punished for entering the United States ―at a 
time or place other than as designated by immigration officers.‖42 
Moreover, the penalty for an alien who has been removed or denied 
entry and subsequently ―enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time 
found in, the United States‖ is a fine, imprisonment up to two years, 
or both.
43
 There are criminal penalties for any such alien who meets 
any of a number of statutorily defined criteria.
44
 These penalties are 
consistent with the government‘s history of using exclusion of aliens 
to protect the safety and well-being of citizens and registered aliens. 
 
Service (―INS‖) processing center. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1228(a)(1)–1228(a)(3)(B) (2006). Moreover, 
the IIRAIRA empowered judges to order removal of deportable aliens upon the request of a 
United States Attorney and the concurrence of the Commissioner of the INS. Id. § 1228(c)(1). 
And while it preserved the alien‘s right to counsel, the IIRAIRA did not create a right to 
expedited procedures. Id. §§ 1228(a)(1)–1228(a)(2). 
 In this last respect, the statute in effect codified a number of decisions in suits brought by 
criminal aliens who sought expedited removal proceedings. See, e.g., Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 
311 (9th Cir. 1995); Giddings v. Chandler, 979 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1992); Aguirre v. Meese, 
930 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1991); Prieto v. Gulch, 913 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1990); Gonzalez v. 
INS, 867 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1989). In general, these cases held that ―there was no private right 
to action by a detained alien to an expedited deportation hearing.‖ 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 
11, § 64.07. 
 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a) (2006). 
 41. Id. § 1228(a)(1). 
 42. Id. § 1325(b). The penalty is a $50–$250 fine the first time an alien is caught entering 
or attempting to enter in violation of the statute, and twice that any time thereafter. Id. 
Moreover, ―[c]ivil penalties under this subsection are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any 
criminal or other civil penalties that may be imposed.‖ Id. 
 43. Id. § 1326(a). 
 44. Id. § 1326(b). The criteria are: (1) having been removed after being convicted of 
multiple violent or drug-related crimes; (2) having been removed after being convicted of an 
aggravated felony; (3) having been excluded for being involved in terrorist activity; and (4) 
having been removed before completion of a sentence of imprisonment for commission of a 
nonviolent crime. Id. The criminal penalties range in maximum sentences from ten to twenty 
years. Id. 
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B. Federal Deportation Statutes 
As previously noted, the Alien Act of 1798 was the first federal 
statute providing for the deportation of alien enemies and aliens 
―dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.‖45 
Thereafter, the grounds for deportation expanded with the restrictions 
on immigration. Early deportation laws were enforceable only within 
a statute of limitations.
46
 The statute of limitations for deportation 
was increased from one to three years in 1907,
47
 and to five in 1917.
48
 
Finally, the 1952 INA provided for the expulsion of illegal entrants 
without a time bar.
49
 
The exclusion theory of deportation justified the eradication of 
deportation statutes of limitations. Under this theory, an alien who 
would have been excluded had she attempted to enter legally should 
not be allowed to remain in the United States merely because she 
evaded detection.
50
 Under the exclusion theory, ―[b]arring the 
admission of undesirables and ejecting those who evaded the bar 
were regarded as different sides of the same coin.‖51 
In addition to expanding the time within which deportation 
statutes were enforceable, Congress steadily expanded the grounds 
for deportation. In 1910, Congress allowed the deportation of aliens 
linked to prostitution in the United States.
52
 Unlike previous grounds 
for expulsion, this statute did not depend upon unlawful entry, but 
 
 45. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.01[2][a] (citing Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 
Stat. 570). Enacted in a climate generally favoring immigration, the Alien Act was allowed to 
expire. Id. 
 46. The contract labor laws, for example, allowed deportation within one year of entry. Id. 
(citing Act of Oct. 19, 1888, 25 Stat. 566). 
 47. Id. § 71.01[2][b][iii] (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 20, 34 Stat. 904). 
 48. Id. (citing Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889). 
 49. Id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163). Thus, 
delay in deporting illegal entrants did not invalidate their eventual deportation. Id. (citing 
Hamadeh v. INS, 343 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1965); Gestuvo v. Dist. Dir. Of U.S INS, 337 F. Supp. 
1093 (C.D. Cal. 1971)). Moreover, the duration of noncitizen aliens‘ residence in the United 
States did not exempt them from expulsion. Id. (citing Oliver v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 517 F.2d 
426 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 50. That is, ―[i]f the cause for exclusion existed at the time of entry, it is believed that 
such aliens are just as undesirable at any subsequent time as they are within the five years after 
entry.‖ Id. at n.28 (citing S. Rep. No. 81-515, at 389 (1950)). 
 51. Id. § 71.01[2][a]. 
 52. Id. (citing Act of March 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 263). 
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rather upon unlawful behavior after entry.
53
 The 1910 Act reflected 
the punishment theory of deportation, under which ―deportation was 
imposed as a form of punishment for . . . misconduct.‖54 
The 1952 INA incorporated both the exclusion and punishment 
theories of deportation. It applied all grounds for deportation 
retroactively and without a statute of limitations.
55
 Moreover, it 
expanded the grounds for deportation, including criminal 
convictions.
56
 The Immigration Act of 1990 narrowed deportation to 
five classes of noncitizens, providing harsh mandates concerning 
aliens convicted of serious crimes, including those related to 
controlled substances.
57
 
Beyond the exclusion and punishment theories, two additional 
principles permeate the Act. First, federalism generally prevents state 
regulation of immigration. Courts have held that it is Congress‘s 
province to dictate United States immigration policy
58
 and to deport 
aliens.
59
 Thus, state interference with congressional mandates violates 
the Constitution.
60
 Second, deportation must be treated as a civil, not 
criminal, action.
61
 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing President‘s Comm‘n on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom we Shall 
Welcome 200 (1953)). 
 55. Id. §§ 71.01[2][b][i]–71.01[2][b][ii]. 
 56. Id. § 2.03[2][f]. 
 57. Id. § 71.01[2][c]. 
 58. Id. § 71.02[1]. See also McJunkin v. INS, 579 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating 
that ―Congress possesses plenary power over immigration.‖). 
 59. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952) (stating that immigration ―is 
a matter of permission and tolerance. The Government‘s power to terminate its hospitality has 
been asserted by this Court since the question first arose.‖). 
 60. GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.02[1]. For example, the Supreme Court has 
―struck down . . . state statutes restricting the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits, 
prohibiting children of undocumented aliens from free public education, and banning fishing 
licenses to any person not eligible for citizenship.‖ Id. (citations omitted). But the Supreme 
Court upheld a state statute penalizing knowing employers of illegal aliens. Id. (citing De Canas 
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). Gordon noted the possible importance that ―no federal employer 
sanctions for employing unauthorized aliens existed at the time.‖ Id. 
 61. Id. § 71.01[4][a] (citing Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913)). 
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C. Deportation for Controlled Substances Violations and the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
As early as 1922, alien narcotics offenders were subject to 
expulsion.
62
 The INA of 1952 incorporated the deportation of aliens 
convicted of drug crimes,
63
 and as the national drug problem 
consumed the government‘s criminal regulatory conscience through 
the second half of the twentieth century, immigration law kept pace.
64
 
Deportation under current law requires only a conviction of an 
applicable local, state, federal, or foreign controlled substance crime, 
regardless of sentencing, suspended sentencing, or probationary 
sentencing.
65
 
D. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines 
The Kansas legislature adopted presumptive criminal sentencing 
guidelines in 1993.
66
 These guidelines had several recognized 
purposes, including matching punishment to culpability and making 
sentencing more uniform.
67
 Despite some changes to the statutory 
 
 62. Id. § 71.05[5][a][I] (citing Act of May 26, 1922, 42 Stat. 596). 
 63. Id. § 2.03[2][f]. 
 64. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 expanded upon earlier statutes, 
including as grounds for deportation narcotics addiction and violation of ―any law or regulation 
of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance.‖ Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3207. Later, in the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress included 
among grounds for deportation ―narcotic drug abuse[]‖ and attempt to violate any drug law. 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 65. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.05[5][b]. Unlike all other narcotics grounds 
for deportation, deportation of narcotic drug addicts and abusers does not require a conviction. 
Hernaez v. INS, 244 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 66. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 479 (codified as amended 
at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4701 et seq. (1995)). See Randall L. Hodgkinson, A Blakely Primer: 
The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, CHAMPION, Aug. 28, 2004, at 20. 
 67. In particular, the goals were: 
(1) Prison space should be reserved for serious/violent offenders; (2) the degree of 
sanctions imposed should be based on the harm inflicted; (3) sanctions should be 
uniform and not related to socioeconomic factors, race, or geographic location; (4) 
penalties should be clear so everyone can understand exactly what has occurred after 
they are imposed; (5) incarceration should be reserved for serious violent offenders 
who present a threat to public safety; (6) the State has an obligation to rehabilitate 
those incarcerated, but persons should not be sent to prison solely to gain education or 
job skills; and (7) the system should be rational to allow policymakers to allocate 
resources. 
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scheme, the guidelines remain the driving force behind Kansas‘s 
sentencing schedule. 
The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (―KSGA‖) allows for a 
judge to depart from the sentencing guidelines for ―substantial and 
compelling reasons.‖68 KSGA makes no distinction between 
dispositional—i.e., from probationary to imprisoning sentences or 
vice versa
69—and durational departure sentences.70 Upward departure 
requires a jury‘s finding71 of one or more aggravating 
circumstances,
72
 which compel the judge ―to leave the status quo.‖73 
Among the accepted extrastatutory factors is the defendant‘s lack of 
amenity to probation.
74
 
Currently KSGA has separate guidelines for drug and nondrug 
offenses.
75
 This division reflects the legislature‘s attitude toward drug 
offenses as opposed to all other types of crimes.
76
 
 
State v. McKay, 26 P.3d 58, 62 (Kan. 2001) (citing State v. Favela, 911 P.2d 792, 805 (Kan. 
1996)). See also Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Martinez, 165 P.3d 1050 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2007) (No. 06-96613-A) (attempting to summarize McKay‘s list of rationales). 
 68. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act § 21-4716(a). 
 69. Id. § 21-4703(g). 
 70. See id. § 21-4716; Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 2 (citing State v. Billington, 
953 P.2d 1059 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 71. The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), affected the burden of proof required to grant a prosecutor‘s motion for an upward 
departure sentence. Hodgkinson, supra note 66, at 20. The Supreme Court of Kansas 
subsequently held KSGA‘s procedure for upward departure sentencing unconstitutional. State 
v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001). The statutory scheme improperly allowed judges who found 
one or more aggravating factors to depart to twice the maximum prescribed sentence. Id. at 814. 
In accordance with the Kansas Supreme Court‘s ruling, the legislature amended KSGA‘s 
upward departure provision to require a jury‘s finding of the aggravating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Hodgkinson, supra note 66, at 20. 
 72. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act § 21-4716(C)(2). The statute lists examples of 
aggravating factors, which ―focus on a certain conduct involved in, or motivation behind, the 
offense, and a certain victim or victim relationship.‖ Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 5. 
The statute‘s list is not exhaustive. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act § 21-4716(c)(2). 
 73. Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 4. 
 74. See id. at 5 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 8 P.3d 712 (2000)). Being a nonobjective 
writing, this appellate brief interprets the exception narrowly, only for cases in which a 
particular defendant has, through prior conduct, proven likely to violate the prescribed 
probationary sentence. Id. 
 75. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act §§ 21-4704 to 21-4705. 
 76. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), amended by Immigration Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4978, 
redesignated by IIRAIRA § 305(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009–597. Marking drug crime as a cause 
for removal, this statute is the analog in the immigrant removal system to the KSGA. 
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E. State v. Martinez: The Intersection of Immigration Policy and 
Statutory Sentencing Guidelines 
The Kansas Court of Appeals encountered a novel issue of 
interpretation of federal immigration statutes and state sentencing 
guidelines in State v. Martinez,
77
 where the two policies seemed to be 
in conflict.
78
 
1. Facts Established before Appeal 
Nicholas Martinez sold cocaine to an undercover police officer on 
two occasions,
79
 after which the police arrested him and obtained a 
warrant to search his home.
80
 Martinez entered a guilty plea to an 
amended charge of possession of cocaine and child endangerment.
81
 
Under the KSGA, possession of cocaine by a first-time offender 
carries a prescribed penalty of probation.
82
 Reacting to Martinez‘s 
admission of his alienage at his sentencing hearing,
83
 the trial court 
determined that he was not amenable to probation due to conflicting 
federal and state laws, as his unregistered presence in the United 
States would constitute an ongoing violation of the term of his 
 
 77. 165 P.3d 1050 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). 
 78. The court of appeals relied on two decisions from Oregon for the proposition that a 
defendant‘s ―immigration status is not per se relevant‖ to sentencing, but that it may 
demonstrate an unwillingness to conform with legal requirements, which in turn is relevant. Id. 
at 1055–56 (citing State v. Zavala-Ramos, 840 P.2d 1314 (Or. Ct. App. (1992)); State v. 
Morales-Aguilar, 855 P.2d 646 (Or. Ct. App. (1993)). 
 79. On the first occasion, Martinez employed his minor son to transfer the cocaine; on the 
second, Martinez delivered the drugs himself. Id. at 1054.  
 80. The subsequent search turned up more cocaine, two stolen social security cards, and a 
fraudulent Immigration and Nationalization Service Resident Alien card, issued to one of the 
victims of the social security card theft but featuring a photograph of Martinez‘s wife. Id. 
 81. Originally, Martinez was charged with sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute, endangering a child, theft, and unlawful possession of an identification card. 
Id. 
 82. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act § 21-4705(a); Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 
6. As a term of the plea bargain, the prosecution recommended the presumptive probationary 
sentence. 
 83. At Martinez‘s plea hearing, regarding his eligibility for drug treatment, his counsel 
said, ―I believe Mr. Martinez, because of his citizenship and status, may or may not be eligible 
. . . for the mandatory treatment. He may or may not be here. I think . . . that he risks the fate of 
his brother that [sic] I represented on similar charges [sic] who was deported, and Mr. 
Martinez—if the INS continues, . . . I expect that that‘s what‘s going to happen. We certainly 
have not guaranteed Mr. Martinez that‘s not going to happen.‖ Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1054. 
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probation.
84
 The court sentenced him to eleven months‘ 
imprisonment on the drug offense and a concurrent one-year sentence 
for endangering a child. 
2. District Court‘s Sentencing and Rationale 
Martinez‘s sentence was a dispositional upward departure from 
the prescribed probationary sentence, thus requiring a substantial and 
compelling rationale.
85
 The district court‘s reason for departure was 
its identification of a conflict between federal immigration laws and 
the terms of the probation that the KSGA suggested.
86
 This was the 
only clear reason the district judge offered for the departure 
sentence.
87
 
3. The Appeal 
Martinez appealed the sentence, arguing that ―his status as an 
illegal alien was not a substantial and compelling reason to deny him 
presumptive probation.‖88 The State argued that Martinez‘s 
 
 84. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610(a) (2000). 
 85. See Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act § 21-4705(a). See also Brief for Appellant, 
supra note 67, at 6 (noting that Martinez‘s criminal history qualified him for the minimum 
sentence for cocaine possession, a relatively minor drug offense). 
 86. According to the record of the sentencing hearing, the district judge said, 
Okay, . . . the problem that arises for me is to follow these guidelines here because Mr. 
Martinez is illegally in the country and is in violation of the probation rules right from 
the start if I were to place him on probation. . . . [H]e . . . has to comply with all the 
conditions of the probation and he can‘t do that because he‘s in violation of the law not 
to violate any federal or state laws. And so for that reason, I am going to have a big 
problem following these guidelines. 
Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1055. 
 87. Id. at 1056. 
 88. Id. In his appellate brief, Martinez argued against the sentence as a violation of his 
rights of due process and equal protection. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 7 (citing 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). Martinez relied on Plyler for the propositions that illegal 
aliens are among the ―‗persons‘ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,‖ and that the possibility of removal does not negate the application of ―the full 
range of obligations imposed by the State‘s civil and criminal laws.‖ Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205, 
210, 215. Martinez accused the district court of unconstitutionally ―singl[ing] him out for a 
departure sentence of imprisonment because he may have unlawfully entered this country,‖ and 
of usurping the federal government‘s province to determine individuals‘ immigration status. 
Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 7. 
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immigration status was not the direct reason for the departure 
sentence.
89
 The State further argued that Martinez‘s presence in the 
United States was in violation of federal law, rendering him 
unamenable to probation.
90
 The court of appeals found that the 
district court had sentenced him directly because of his immigrant 
status.
91
 
The court of appeals described the possible inconsistency between 
the presumed probationary sentence and the defendant‘s immigration 
status, noting that, ―had Martinez previously been deported and 
reentered the country illegally, the district court‘s observations would 
be correct: Each day he served on probation would be a day on which 
he violated 8 U.S.C. § 1326.‖92 Moreover, state courts have no 
authority ―with respect to the classification of aliens.‖93 
However, the court found no inconsistency in a probationary 
sentence for a defendant who had violated § 1325 but not § 1326.
94
 It 
 
 89. Rather, the State argued that Martinez‘s immigration status resulted in the illegality of 
his continued unregistered presence in the United States, which in turn resulted in Martinez‘s 
non-amenability to probation, the direct cause of the departure sentence. Brief for Appellee at 6, 
State v. Martinez, 165 P.3d 1050 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (No. 06-96613-A). 
 90. Id. at 5. The State argued in passing that Martinez‘s failure to demonstrate a 
willingness to comply with the law was manifest in his failure, before or after pleading guilty, 
to attempt to change his resident status. Id. at 6. 
 91. According to the court of appeals, among the primary issues was ―whether the fact 
that [Martinez] is an illegal alien justifies the denial of presumptive probation.‖ Martinez, 165 
P.3d at 1054. Moreover, the court of appeals claimed that ―the district court concluded, and the 
State argue[d] on appeal, that Martinez‘[s] immigration status alone made him ineligible for 
probation without further examination of his willingness or ability to conform his conduct to the 
law or to fulfill the terms of his proposed plan of probation.‖ Id. at 1055. But see Brief for 
Appellee, supra note 89, at 6 (―The district court did not depart from the presumptive sentence 
. . . because of [Martinez‘s] resident status. The court departed because the defendant was in 
current and ongoing violation of federal law.‖). However, the court of appeals ruled finally 
against Martinez on this issue, and disposed of the case on other grounds. Martinez, 165 P.3d at 
1058. 
 92. Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1057. Moreover, the court of appeals noted that the probation 
sentence would have included a travel restriction, requiring Martinez to remain within 100 
miles of his residence, and inside Kansas borders, except with permission from his assigned 
court services officer. Id. The court concluded, ―[t]hus, it is readily apparent that fulfillment of 
the statutorily mandated and additional recommended probation terms would have been 
inconsistent with Martinez continuing to reside in this country as an illegal alien throughout the 
term of his probation.‖ Id. Such an inconsistency would lead to a dilemma by which court 
services officers may be encouraged to ―look the other way‖ to avoid having to revoke the 
probationary sentence, an unacceptable result. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1058. 
 94. Id. at 1057. 
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distinguished between the prohibition against entry in § 1325 and the 
culpability under § 1326 of an alien ―at any time found‖ in the United 
States.
95
 The court found support in two federal decisions for the 
proposition that a violation of § 1325 does not make a ―person‘s 
ongoing presence in the United States in and of itself . . . a crime 
unless that person has been previously deported and regained illegal 
entry into this country.‖96 
The court also relied on the distinction between the civil remedy 
of deportation and the underlying crime in a deportation action.
97
 If 
Martinez entered in violation of § 1325, ―his ongoing presence is not 
a crime though he is subject to deportation.‖98 Immigration law does 
not necessarily impute a crime wherever it contemplates an alien‘s 
amenability to removal. 
Limiting the breadth of its opinion, the court ruled against 
Martinez on several non-dispositive issues and expounded on the 
sentencing consequences of a defendant‘s violation of § 1326.99 The 
 
 95. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1996). Although the court did not parse § 1326 so explicitly, it is 
a fair assumption that this was the language it considered, since it then described the possible 
inconsistency between the presumed probationary sentence and the defendant‘s immigration 
status. 
 96. Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1056 (citing United States v. Rincon-Jimenez, 595 F.2d 1192, 
1193–94 (9th Cir. 1979)). The Kansas Court of Appeals also noted that § 1325 and similar 
statutes ―are not continuing [offenses], as ‗entry‘ is limited to a particular locality and hardly 
suggests continuity.‖ Id. at 1056 (citing United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408 n.6 (1958)). 
 Notably, a proposed amendment to § 1325 would add ―or . . . is otherwise present in the 
United States in violation of the immigration laws or the regulations prescribed thereunder,‖ to 
the circumstances triggering the criminal penalties contained therein. H.R. 4065, 110th Cong. 
§ 203(2)(C) (2007). Another proposed bill would make violation of § 1325 a felony. H.R. 4192, 
110th Cong. § 312(b) (2007). Passage of these bills may alter the result in cases like Martinez. 
 97. Id. at 1056. See also 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.01[4][a] (citing 
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913)). This was an important distinction because the 
defense apparently conceded Martinez‘s deportability at the sentencing hearing. Martinez, 165 
F.3d at 1054. 
 98. Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1057. The court interpreted the distinction between § 1325 and 
§ 1326 as requiring a remand to the district court for determination whether Martinez had been 
denied entry or removed and reentered, in violation of § 1326. Martinez was unamenable to 
probation, and the departure sentence thus was justified, if and only if he had violated § 1326. 
Id. 
 99. First, Martinez argued that the district court improperly adjudicated his immigration 
status, but the court of appeals denied that his status was adjudicated at all in the lower court. 
Id. at 1057–58. See also 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.02[1] (describing the many 
ways in which federal immigration policy binds states‘ actions regarding aliens). Second, 
Martinez argued that the departure sentence violated his rights of due process and equal 
protection, but the court was not persuaded by his argument, and used his own sources against 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  With a Little Help from My Friends 209 
 
 
court employed a reductio ad absurdum argument: if a violation of 
§ 1326 did not render a defendant unamenable to probation, then a 
government official entrusted with enforcing the law would be made 
to supervise a probationary sentence known to be inconsistent with 
the very laws she must uphold.
100
 
The court claimed to be restricted to ―interpreting and applying 
the law.‖101In so professing, the court again stressed the district 
court‘s authority over dispositional sentencing departures where a 
defendant is unamenable to probation, and maintained that 
Martinez‘s sentence therefore would be appropriate if he were found 
in violation of § 1326.
102
 
II. TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT AND THEIR 
MISAPPLICATION IN MARTINEZ 
A. The Evolution of Federal Immigration Law toward an Exclusive 
United States 
The history of United States immigration policy demonstrates 
that, at any given time, the law reflects the perceived social and 
economic needs of the nation, and that the justifications and 
 
him. Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1058 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (―[T]he Constitution 
does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated as though they were 
the same.‖)). See also Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 7. Finally, Martinez argued that it 
was inconsistent for the district court to deny probation and grant an appeal bond, but the court 
of appeals summarily held that ―[t]he appropriateness of an appeal bond is not determinative of 
whether a substantial and compelling reason supports his departure sentence.‖ Martinez, 165 
P.3d at 1058. 
 100. Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1057. The court quoted Justice Brandeis: ―Our government is 
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law into himself; it invites anarchy.‖ Id. (citing Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 101. The court said as follows: 
We do not presume to breach the line between interpreting and applying the law on 
one hand and establishing public policy on the other. We leave the latter task to our 
legislative branch. But our legislature . . . has mandated a provision in every probation 
plan that the defendant, during the term of probation, not violate the laws [of] the 
United States. So long as this remains the law of our state, we must refrain from any 
activity that undermines its clear and unequivocal intent. 
Id. at 1058–59. 
 102. Id. at 1059. 
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procedures for removal fluctuate in severity with the grounds for 
exclusion. Thus, Congress‘s allowance for removal based on 
convictions for controlled substance violations reflects a modern 
alertness and disfavor toward drug trafficking and abuse by 
unregistered aliens. 
The early years of the United States‘ development were marked 
by open-door policies encouraging immigration and the 
corresponding influx of social and economic capital. The few 
restrictive laws were poorly enforced.
103
 These policies reflected the 
general expectation that immigration as often as not benefitted both 
the individual immigrant and the United States.
104
 When it became 
apparent that not all immigration was helpful to the nation‘s social 
and economic growth, Congress began to react. 
The Alien Act, which allowed the president to deport persons who 
would hinder, rather than benefit, the United States, was an early 
embodiment of the principle that immigration generally, but not 
always, is mutually beneficial.
105
 After failed experiments with 
openness, Congress altered its position and began to experiment with 
a restrictive immigration policy.
106
 Congress‘s consistent adherence 
to restrictive immigration policies in the intervening decades, with 
very few exceptions,
107
 indicates that exclusion was favorable to the 
legislators‘ constituencies. 
 
 103. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 104. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 440 (1849) (―Keeping in view of the spirit of the 
Declaration of Independence with respect to the importance of augmenting the population of the 
United States, and the early laws of naturalization, Congress, at divers [sic] subsequent periods, 
passed laws to facilitate and encourage more and more the immigration of Europeans into the 
United States for the purposes of settlement and residence.‖); see also Anna Byrne, Note, 
Special Project: Current Issues In Immigration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (―While 
fear of foreigners always existed, the United States had a liberal and inviting immigration 
policy in its early years. The country needed immigrants to help develop its vast territories.‖) 
(citation omitted). 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 12–14. The young United States needed to 
encourage immigration, however, so the legislature began enacting initiatives incentivizing 
movement to the United States. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. These early 
congressional policies favoring immigration were unsuccessful, to the extent that the results did 
not inspire the confidence of the American people, who already were adopting a level of 
jingoism. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 107. Since it began restricting immigration broadly, the United States has relaxed its policy 
only in very limited circumstances—especially in the wake of World War II, when the United 
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The first grounds for exclusion—prostitution and mental and 
physical illnesses
108—were proxies for the perceived likelihood that 
immigrants would do more harm than good for national growth. The 
contract labor laws exemplified Congress‘s goal of preventing the 
corruption of the nation‘s economic well-being.109 Congress‘s short-
sighted purpose was to prevent an influx of cheap labor, which it 
considered a threat to the employment and compensation prospects of 
United States citizens. Finally, when the people sensed that 
immigration threatened national security, especially at its peak during 
the industrial revolution, they turned to Congress to enact even more 
restrictive laws.
110
 
The evolution of immigration law provides a window into the 
ever-changing attitudes toward immigration, particularly the costly 
and beneficial effects it is perceived to have on the state of the 
nation.
111
 The current United States policy of general exclusion 
demonstrates a level of contentedness with the current composition of 
its populace and an expectation that immigration generally does more 
harm than good to its safety, society, and economy. 
The exclusion theory of deportation teaches that grounds and 
procedures for removal ought to reflect the exclusionary regime. 
Under that theory, deportation fulfills the need to expunge the nation 
of aliens who would have been excluded but for their evasion of 
immigration officers.
112
 The more strictly anti-immigration the policy 
is, the more extensive are its grounds for removal.
113
 As the perceived 
 
States was reemerging on a global scale as a stable refuge for victims of persecution, and when 
its returning soldiers relied on the government to allow immigration of their families. See supra 
note 33. 
 108. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 110. Threatened by a potential wave of immigration after World War I, Congress began 
imposing quotas on immigration. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 111. For example, Congress enacted such short-sighted, reflexive legislation as the 
exclusion of anarchists and subversives in the wake of the McKinley assassination. See supra 
note 37. 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78. In brief, removal must be coextensive with 
exclusion. 
 113. As Congress expanded its exclusion laws, it also extended the time period reaching 
from the time of the alien‘s unlawful conduct to the initiation of deportation proceedings. By 
1952, there was no time limitation; this element of deportation procedure reflected the attitude 
favoring exclusion, by refusing to distinguish between exclusion at the time of attempted entry 
from later removal. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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threats of immigrants worsened, deportation procedures became less 
lenient toward aliens and more convenient for government officials, 
allowing eventually for expedited proceedings at correctional 
facilities and retroactive application of grounds for deportation.
114
 
The breadth of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which reaches 
to nearly all offenses related to controlled substances,
115
 reflects 
popular intolerance of drug offenders. The Act‘s strict retroactivity 
further reveals the United States‘ impatience with alien drug 
offenders. The automatic triggering of removal proceedings by drug 
offenses conforms to the generally strict policy against immigration 
of persons perceived to pose a threat to the nation. 
B. The Policy of Statutory Sentencing Guidelines 
Just as the United States‘ immigration law expresses the attitudes 
of American citizens toward immigrants, a government‘s sentencing 
guidelines can determine, at least in part, whether a populace is 
―tough on crime‖ or ―easy on crime‖.116 The Kansas legislature 
designed the KSGA to serve two basic functions,
117
 which it fulfills 
by prescribing temporal and dispositional boundaries while allowing 
judges to depart under compelling circumstances. 
C. Federalism Concerns of Immigration Policymaking and 
Regulation 
In an area of the law over which Congress exercises ―plenary 
power,‖ it is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause118 for a 
 
 114. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 115. The only exception is for a conviction of less than thirty grams of marijuana intended 
for personal use. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.05[5][c]. 
 116. More specifically, the prescribed sentence for any particular class of crimes should 
reflect the values of the legislature, namely whether preventing instances of that crime is a high 
priority. 
 117. First, the guidelines exist to provide a framework within which the judiciary can mete 
out punishment systematically, predictably, and equitably among various classes of convicted 
criminals. Second, sentencing guidelines provide sentencing judges with flexibility, even as 
they dictate the factors that control sentencing. 
 118. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (―This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.‖). 
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state to interfere with federal policy.
119
 Where federal immigration 
law
120
 intersects with state criminal law, it is therefore important for 
the state to enable, and not to interfere with, the effective operation of 
the United States‘ policies and enforcement schemes.121 
D. The Problem with Martinez 
The Kansas Court of Appeals‘s decision in Martinez, requiring 
adherence to the KSGA‘s prescriptive probationary sentence even for 
a criminal who is subject to removal by the federal government, 
obfuscates the purposes of immigration law and the sentencing 
guidelines themselves.
122
 To illustrate, consider two alternatives: (1) 
Martinez violated § 1326, having reentered the United States after 
being removed or excluded; or (2) Martinez did not violate § 1326 
but violated § 1325 by evading immigration officials when he entered 
the United States.
123
 
The court treated these two situations differently. It correctly 
speculated that in the first circumstance, Martinez would be 
unamenable to probation, and an upward sentence requiring 
imprisonment therefore would be appropriate.
124
 
 
 119. Thus, courts have invalidated state statutes on this ground, ruling that the federal 
government possesses plenary authority on issues of international affairs. See, e.g., McJunkin v. 
INS, 579 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1978); 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.02[1]; see also 
supra text accompanying notes 67—69. The Constitution balances this presumptive federal 
supremacy against the Tenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. X (―The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.‖), which protects states against intrusions by the federal 
government. On the balance of powers between the states and the federal government, see 
generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992). 
 120. The courts have established that Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration. 
See supra text accompanying notes 58–61. 
 121. This emphatically is the case, considering the immigration enforcement troubles of the 
United States government. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
 122. In particular, the court did not consider the flexibility of the KSGA. See supra notes 
68–74 and accompanying text (describing departure sentencing within the framework of the 
KSGA). 
 123. In either situation, Martinez is subject to removal. A violation of either section 
requires this result, because a person who is excludable also is removable. See infra note 124 
and accompanying text. Moreover, he is removable for having been convicted of an offense 
related to illegal drugs. See supra Part I.C. 
 124. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. If Martinez were incarcerated, expedited 
removal proceedings could be undertaken at the correctional facility. See supra note 41 and 
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In the second situation, the court in Martinez ruled that Martinez 
would be amenable to probation. In reaching its decision, the court 
relied on cases ruling that a violation of § 1325 occurs at the discrete 
moment of unlawful entry.
125
 By not imprisoning Martinez, the state 
would evade the in-house removal proceedings of the correctional 
facility, which had been established for the convenience of the 
undermanned and underfunded immigration officials.
126
 
The distinction the court drew between violations of §§ 1325 and 
1326 is based on a mere technicality.
127
 The result is unsettling. 
Instead of facing almost certain removal, which the law requires for 
similarly situated immigrants, Martinez likely escapes this civil 
penalty and paradoxically is required to remain in the United 
States.
128
 His commission of a crime enabled his avoidance of 
removal; the court effectively incentivized violators of § 1325 to 
commit crimes for which the prescribed penalty is probation. 
III. A PROPOSAL TO REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS‘S VERDICT 
The result of Martinez is anomalous. The court itself noted the 
dangers of a government‘s acquiescence to the abuse of its laws.129 
By refusing to treat a convict‘s prior § 1325 violation as an 
aggravating factor in sentencing to allow a dispositional upward 
departure, Kansas has interfered with the efficient enforcement of 
federal law
130
 and fallen into Justice Brandeis‘s trap.131 
 
accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. Thus, even if Martinez entered 
illegally, his continued presence in Kansas, subject to probationary supervision, would be 
consistent with the term of probation, that he shall not break any state or federal laws during his 
probationary term. 
 126. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The odds that Martinez would not face 
removal proceedings are much greater if he serves probation than if he faces jail time. 
 127. The difference in Martinez‘s behavior is not in the offense for which he was 
convicted, but in the circumstances of his illegal entry into the United States, which do not 
control his immigration status with respect to removability. 
 128. Martinez would have state-imposed limitations on his mobility. See supra note 92. 
 129. Recall Justice Brandeis‘s words: ―Our government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, . . . it invites anarchy.‖ Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 130. Given the lack of resources dedicated to immigration enforcement, it may be fair to 
say that an interference with the efficiency of operations is itself an interference with effect. See 
supra note 6. 
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A. An Anomaly Built upon Misconception 
The court erroneously considered its decision bound by federal 
case law interpreting § 1325(a).
132
 In examining the criminality of 
Martinez‘s continuing presence in the United States under § 1325(a), 
the court neglected the other half of the legal system—that imposing 
civil liability upon its violators.
133
 The court inappropriately 
narrowed the scope of the statute by reading out the applicability of 
civil penalties, such as removal under § 1227.
134
 
The court should not have relied solely on federal cases discussing 
the ongoing criminality of an alien‘s entry, but rather should have 
looked to the noncriminal statutes that defense counsel and the court 
itself acknowledged Martinez was violating.
135
 It should have 
considered the entire federal scheme of immigration law enforcement 
and immigrant registration. If it had, it likely would have concluded 
differently in Martinez, and its conclusion would have harmonized 
with the plain language of the general terms of probation and the 
federal exclusionary regime. 
B. Supposing the Court did not Misconceive . . . 
Given the language of the statutory conditions of probation,
136
 the 
court of appeals erroneously disregarded federal civil penalties that 
negated Martinez‘s amenability to probation.137 Suppose, however, 
 
 131. See supra note 129. 
 132. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. This case law distinguished § 1326(a), 
an ongoing criminal offense, from § 1325(a), a one-time criminal violation. This distinction 
relies on the language in § 1326 that any alien who ―is at any time found in[] the United States‖ 
is subject to punishment. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1996). Section 1325 lacks similar language. Id. 
§ 1325(a). 
 133. The ―standard conditions of probation‖ under Kansas law do not distinguish between 
civil and criminal laws in requiring that ―the court shall condition any order granting probation 
. . . on the defendant‘s obedience of the laws of the United States, the state of Kansas and any 
other jurisdiction to the laws of which the defendant may be subject.‖ State v. Gary, 144 P.3d 
634, 639 (Kan. 2006) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–4610(a) (2006)). 
 134. Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1056 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000)). 
 135. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000). 
 136. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610(a) (2000). 
 137. These penalties would have justified the district court‘s departure sentence. Martinez, 
165 P.3d at 1057 (―[O]ur courts have repeatedly recognized that [nonamenability to probation] 
is [a substantial and compelling reason to depart].‖). 
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that the court was correct in focusing only on Martinez‘s criminal 
liability. Although it found the federal cases defining criminality 
under § 1325(a) compelling, the court was not bound to follow them. 
The KSGA was designed to preserve a measure of judicial flexibility 
in sentencing.
138
 Although the parties‘ briefs in Martinez focused on 
Martinez‘s non-amenability to probation as a possible aggravating 
factor, since it had been recognized by earlier courts,
139
 the district 
judge‘s decision needed support by ―substantial and compelling 
reasons.‖140 
The appellate court ought to have considered cooperation with 
federal immigration law enforcement efforts a substantial and 
compelling reason to depart from the presumptive probationary 
sentence. Martinez‘s immigration status was not in dispute.141 The 
appellate court was somewhat bound by the trial record; the trial 
judge was required to state her substantial and compelling reasons for 
departure in the record.
142
 The court of appeals‘s decision relied 
heavily on the presumption that ―[t]here is no question that 
Martinez‘[s] status as an illegal alien was the fact which prompted 
the [sentencing] court to depart.‖143 
Yet the question lingers: What did the district court intend by ―in 
violation of the probation rules‖?144 Given the basic division between 
 
 138. Thus, the KSGA allows a judge to depart from the statutory sentence upon a finding 
of one or more aggravating circumstances. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. The 
statute provides a ―nonexclusive list of aggravating factors.‖ Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act 
at § 21-4716(c)(2). See also supra note 99. The list‘s nonexclusivity is necessary to the statute‘s 
flexibility. 
 139. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 140. Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act § 21-4716(c)(2); Martinez, 165 P.3d at 1055. The 
existence of a ―substantial and compelling reason‖ was reviewed de novo on appeal. Id. 
 141. Only Martinez‘s compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326 was in question. Martinez, 165 
P.3d at 1056. It was conceded by his attorney that Martinez had not entered the United States 
legally and therefore was subject to removal. The court of appeals acknowledged the possibility 
of Martinez‘s deportation, but focused instead on the criminality of his presence in the United 
States. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1055 (citing Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act at § 21–4716(a) and State v. 
Murphy, 19 P.3d 80, 82 (Kan. 2001). On the record, the district judge stated, ―Mr. Martinez is 
illegally in the country and is in violation of the probation rules right from the start if I were to 
place him on probation.‖ Id. at 1057. 
 143. Id. at 1055. 
 144. It is clear that by ―probation rules,‖ the district judge was referring to § 21-4610(a) of 
the KSGA, prohibiting a probationer from violating any laws to which she is subject. It also 
may be inferred therefrom that being ―in violation‖ of § 21-4610(a) means being in ongoing 
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the civil and criminal systems, it is arbitrary and inappropriate, when 
confronted with an ambiguity between them, to decide one way 
instead of the other.
145
 The court‘s conjecture was unwarranted and 
inequitable. 
C. Supposing the Court’s Conjecture was Correct . . . 
Now assume, contrary to the plain language of the district judge‘s 
statement of her substantial and compelling reason to depart,
146
 that 
the judge specifically determined that Martinez was in ongoing 
violation of the United States criminal immigration laws
147
 and not its 
civil laws. Assume that her statement, however, was ambiguous.
148
 If 
the court of appeals wrote exactly the Martinez opinion, it would 
have been correct in its supposition that the district judge had meant 
that Martinez violated § 1325(a) or § 1326(a). 
Yet should it have decided, as it did, to reject the upward 
dispositional departure sentence? If the court had considered the 
consequences of its decision,
149
 the sensible conclusion would be 
affirmation of the sentence. 
The immediate consequence of affirming would have been 
Martinez‘s imprisonment in a correctional facility required by law to 
be equipped for removal proceedings.
150
 An affirmation would have 
had at least two other, more remote, consequences. First, it would 
employ the punishment theory of deportation for deterring unwanted 
 
violation of the laws of the United States or Kansas. Yet the court assumed negligently that the 
district court meant that Martinez was violating criminal laws. 
 145. Indeed, the district court would have been correct if Martinez either was in violation 
of criminal laws or subject to civil penalties, and the court of appeals accordingly should have 
considered both possibilities. 
 146. See supra note 133. 
 147. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325–1326 (1996). 
 148. For example, suppose the district court had said, ―Mr. Martinez is in violation of 
United States immigration laws, and thus unamenable to probation, so we are compelled to 
depart from the KSGA.‖ In this statement, ―United States immigration laws‖ could refer equally 
to either criminal or civil laws. 
 149. The court would have considered its role in (1) obstructing the execution of the law by 
federal officials, creating a loophole through which undetected aliens who commit crimes for 
which the prescribed sentence is probation, can find a legal home in the United States; and (2) 
making a general muck of the law in the face of a clear alternative. See supra Part III. 
 150. See supra note 41. 
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behavior.
151
 Whether removal proceedings actually were begun 
against Martinez, the state courts would have furthered the federal 
policy of discouraging, rather than rewarding, illegal entry and 
evasion of immigration officers. 
Second, and more generally, an affirmation of the departure 
sentence, placing Martinez neatly in the hands of immigration 
officers, would help make immigration law enforcement a 
cooperative effort among federal and state governments.
152
 Without 
stepping too heavily on the federal government‘s toes, the Kansas 
courts had the ability to set an example of teamwork to other states. 
After all, where two systems of law intersect as in Martinez, the 
Supremacy Clause and Tenth Amendment encourage restraint by 
each government from advancing its own goals aggressively at the 
expense of the other. 
IV. A BETTER RESULT 
This Note has examined the Kansas Court of Appeals decision in 
Martinez from three real and hypothetical perspectives. Any of these 
perspectives, whichever most closely resembles the realities of that 
case—or those perceived by the appellate court—presents a 
conclusion in opposition to the court‘s opinion. The decision in 
Martinez created an anomaly; where an objective of the law is 
predictability, anomalies are the enemy of success. And while the 
staple of United States immigration law is exclusion and removal of 
aliens who would have been excluded, Martinez sets a precedent of 
state-sponsored inclusion. It forces a state judge to play pardoner, 
sparing a convicted criminal from the full force of the federal law. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals in Martinez barricaded the federal 
government from its efficient administration of the United States 
immigration laws. A different result—allowing the sentencing judge 
to consider the advancement of federal civil enforcement and marked 
by cooperation between the state and federal systems in fulfilling 
 
 151. In this case, since the Kansas courts had no control over the immigration law 
consequences of Martinez‘s departure sentence, the sentence would use the traditional deterrent 
of imprisonment where the deterrent of deportation is uncertain.  
 152. This, after all, was the intended effect of requiring the availability of removal 
proceedings at federal, state, and local correctional facilities. 
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their different, overlapping obligations—would be reasonable, 
simple, and favorable to the uncontested authority of Congress to set 
immigration policies. It would provide a clearer example for future 
defendants in Martinez‘s position. Most importantly for the federal 
system, it would be a deterrent and a rallying point for the states to 
join Congress‘s long history of shutting the nation‘s doors to 
immigrants. 
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